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Abstract – Epidemic spreading and cascading failure are two important dynamical processes
over complex networks. They have been investigated separately for a long history. But in the real
world, these two dynamics sometimes may interact with each other. In this paper, we explore
a model combined with SIR epidemic spreading model and local loads sharing cascading failure
model. There exists a critical value of tolerance parameter that whether the epidemic with high
infection probability can spread out and infect a fraction of the network in this model. When
the tolerance parameter is smaller than the critical value, cascading failure cuts off abundant
of paths and blocks the spreading of epidemic locally. While the tolerance parameter is larger
than the critical value, epidemic spreads out and infects a fraction of the network. A method for
estimating the critical value is proposed. In simulation, we verify the effectiveness of this method
in Baraba´si-Albert (BA) networks.
Introduction. – Epidemic spreading and cascading
failure are extensively investigated in the research of com-
plex networks. Study of epidemics on networks is an area
of special interest including the spreading of infectious dis-
eases, rumors [1] and computer viruses [2], and has deep-
ened our insights into the interplay between topologies
and the spreading dynamics [3–7]. Cascading failure is
another phenomenon that random failures or intentional
attacks lead to severe chain reactions propagating through
links in networks. It is widely found in power transmission
[8, 9], communication [10], economic [11], and biological
[12] networks.
Traditionally, these two dynamics correspond to in-
dependent topics in the research of complex networks,
i.e., when one of them is studied, the other is consid-
ered to be irrelevant. But in practice, there are many
cases in which they interact with each other and neither
of their effects can be ignored. For example, consider a
digital virus spreading over a data communication net-
work. In this scenario, an infected router may not deliver
data packets normally and cause overloading of nearby
routers. These routers then redistribute their loads to
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other routers. Eventually, a large cascading failure occurs.
In turn, the cascading failure also influences the spread-
ing of the virus, because failed nodes cannot deliver data
properly, especially cannot deliver copies of the virus prop-
erly. A real-world case that computer viruses CODE RED
and Nima caused widely reported BGP storms, which is a
cascading failure, was observed in September of 2001 [13].
In our previous work [14], we proposed a model to study
the interplay between epidemic spreading and cascading
failure. In this model, when the two dynamical processes
stop at equilibrium, the nodes both uninfected and un-
failed form several clusters. We considered the relative
size G of the largest one, i.e. the giant component, and
found that in both Erdo¨s-Re´nyi (ER) random networks
and BA scale free networks, with an infectivity over some
threshold, a giant component forms only if the tolerance
parameter α, which captures the capacities of nodes, is
within some interval (αl, αu). In Ref. [14], we have stated
the reason for this – with α under αl, a large-scale cascade
occurs and almost all nodes fail, while with α over αu,
epidemics and cascading failure together kill almost all
nodes.
In this paper, we explore this model from the perspec-
tive of epidemic spreading, while our previous work in-
spected it from the perspective of cascading failure. We
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consider the situation when the infection probability is suf-
ficiently large. In this case, when α is extremely small, the
epidemic dies out locally since cascading failure cuts off al-
most all the paths in the network. When α is sufficiently
large, nodes will never be overloaded, epidemic thus can
spreads out. Therefore, there exists a critical value αc that
whether the epidemic with high infection probability can
spread out. The critical value αc is different from αu in
our previous work. The αc indicates the critical moment
that epidemic starts to spread out but not die out locally,
while αu implies the critical moment that epidemic and
cascading failure kill all nodes in network together. In the
rest of this paper, we devote our effort to further studying
the interplay between epidemics and cascades, and pay
special attention to the critical value αc.
Model. – In Ref. [14], we link the epidemiological SIR
model [15, 16] with a local load sharing cascading failure
model together to form a hybrid model.
In the SIR model, nodes are in one of the three states:
susceptible (S), infected (I), and removed (R). At every
time step, the susceptible node becomes infected with
probability β for every link connecting an infected node
with a susceptible node. The infected node becomes re-
moved with probability γ. The effective spreading rate is
λ = β/γ. For simplicity, we let γ = 1.
In our model, removed nodes in epidemic spreading are
assumed to be not functioning and cannot manipulate
loads. So the spreading of epidemic will lead to load re-
distribution, which may cause cascading failure in the net-
work. We assume that the failed nodes in cascading failure
are not functioning either, so they cannot infect or be in-
fected by others. Because both removed and failed nodes
no longer interact with other nodes in the consequent pro-
cess, they are said to be inactive. All other nodes are said
to be active.
Inspired by previous works [17,18], we assume that when
a node fails, a fixed positive load ∆ is transferred to each
of its active neighbors. Overloaded nodes are those whose
load exceeds their capacity. It is natural to assume that
the capacity Cv of a node v is proportional to its initial
load Lv [19–22]
Cv = (1 + α)Lv, (1)
where the constant α is the tolerance parameter.
The numerical simulation of the hybrid process in an
uncorrelated network with N nodes is summarized as fol-
lows:
1. The initial load of each node is randomly generated
according to a uniform distribution on the interval
[Lmin,Lmax] and its capacity is defined by Eq. (1).
Without loss of generality, we let Lmin = 0 and
Lmax = 1.
2. Randomly select a few nodes in the network as the
initial infected nodes.
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(a) ER random network.
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(b) BA scale-free network.
Fig. 1: The fraction of active nodes Sa as a function of tolerance
parameter α with varying effective spreading rate λ when the
dynamics are terminated. The number of nodes N=5000, and
the average degree 〈k〉 = 8. Each data point is the average over
50 network realizations. In the simulation, ∆, the number of
units of load that a failed node shares with each of its neighbors,
is set to 0.01.
3. For every link connecting an infected node with a sus-
ceptible node, the susceptible node becomes infected
with probability λ, and for every infected node, it
becomes removed with probability 1.
4. The removal may cause load redistribution and possi-
bly cascading failure. Repeat the cascades until there
is no overloaded node in the network.
5. If there exist infected nodes in the network, go back
to 3 to start another step of epidemic spreading; oth-
erwise, the process halts.
Note that we make another assumption that the time
scale of cascading failure is much smaller than that of epi-
demic spreading, so every single step of epidemic spread-
ing is executed until there are no overloaded nodes in the
network.
Analysis. – When the process ends at equilibrium,
the active nodes in the network form several clusters. In
Ref. [14], we use the fraction G of the largest cluster,
namely, the giant component, to measure the performance
p-2
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of the network. But here, for now, we examine the frac-
tion Sa of the active nodes rather than the largest cluster
formed by them, because it is closely related to G and
more likely to be theoretically tractable. Fig. 1 shows Sa
as a function of the tolerance parameter α in ER and BA
networks. When α is extremely small, cascading failure
kills almost all nodes and epidemic dies out locally, thus
Sa is very close to zero. With α increases, the severity of
cascading failure reduces and Sa increases. When α is over
some critical value, αc, the epidemic starts to spread out
and infect a large number of nodes, making Sa decrease.
Preliminaries. Before we introduce the method to
solve the critical value αc in our model, we present some
preliminary remarks.
The spread of disease is equivalent to a bond perco-
lation process [23, 24]. With effective spreading rate λ,
the equivalent process is as follows: select an edge from
network with probability λ, and the outbreak of disease
means that the set of chosen edges forms a connectivity
cluster. The cascading failure is a site percolation pro-
cess [25,26]. There are several nodes participating in both
bond percolation and site percolation processes. We as-
sume that these nodes belong to site percolation process
rather than bond percolation process. The reason for this
assumption is that, although the cascading failure is trig-
gered by the spreading of epidemic, once cascade starts
with a small value of α, most of the paths linked to in-
fected nodes are cut off by cascading failure, and thus the
number of failed nodes from cascading failure will be much
larger than newly infected nodes. Therefore, most of the
nodes participating in both bond percolation and site per-
colation processes are considered to be failed in cascades
eventually, rather than removed in epidemic spreading.
Note that there is a premise that α is small, which means
most of the inactive nodes come from cascades while epi-
demic is restricted in a small scale, since the time scale
of cascading failure is much smaller than that of epidemic
spreading. Based on the assumption above, we define two
types of excessive states to describe the dynamics before
a node becomes inactive as shown in Fig. 2:
Quasi-infected node, a node at least one of whose
edges participates in bond percolation process.
Quasi-failed node, a node takes part in site per-
colation process.
A quasi-failed node will fail in cascades undoubtedly,
while quasi-infected node will become removed or failed
in the end. Denote sk as the probability that a node of
degree k happens to be a quasi-failed node, and bk that it
happens to be a quasi-infected node. Eventually, this node
happens to be failed with probability sk, or be removed
with probability (1− sk)bk.
Further more, in this model, we call a node:
qF
qI R
RYHUORDG
RYHUORDG
LQIHFWA
F
Fig. 2: The transitions between states. The states A, R, F ,
qF and qI are abbreviations for active, removed, failed, quasi-
failed and quasi-infected states respectively. For an active
node, if at least one of its edges participates in bond perco-
lation process, it can be called quasi-infected node, and it will
come to be a removed or failed node. While an active node
takes part in site percolation process, it is described as quasi-
failed node, and finally it will turn out to be a failed node
explicitly.
An m-vulnerable node, if and only if it has m
quasi-failed or quasi-infected neighbors, and it
becomes inactive if all of the m neighbors fail
and share load with it.
A Vulnerable node, if it is an m-vulnerable node,
where m ≥ 0.
The probability that a node of degree k happens to be
a vulnerable node is
fk =
k∑
m=0
f
(m)
k , (2)
where f
(m)
k is the probability that it is an m-vulnerable
node.
When α is small, the number of quasi-failed nodes is
larger than that of quasi-infected nodes, as the time scale
of cascading failure is much smaller than that of epidemic
spreading. Thus vulnerable nodes can be approximated
to quasi-failed nodes, as fk ≈ sk.
Critical Value of Tolerance Parameter . In an uncor-
related network, consider a node v of degree k and any of
its neighbor w. The probability of node w with degree j
is
jpj∑
i
ipi
=
jpj
〈k〉 . Node w becomes vulnerable or infected
with probability 1 − (1 − sj)(1 − bj) = sj + (1 − sj)bj .
Therefore, the probability of node v’s arbitrary neighbor
being quasi-failed or quasi-infected is
∑
j
jpj(sj + (1− sj)bj)
〈k〉
, σf + σr (3)
where σf and σr are the probabilities that node v’s arbi-
trary neighbor happens to be a failed or removed node at
equilibrium, respectively, as follows,
σf ,
∑
j
jpjsj
〈k〉
(4)
σr ,
∑
j
jpj(1 − sj)bj
〈k〉
(5)
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According to Eq. (3), the probability that exactly m of
node v’s neighbors are quasi-failed is
(
k
m
)
(σf + σr)
m (1− σf − σr)
k−m (6)
For node v, its initial load Lv is uniformly distributed
in the range [0,1], so the cumulative distribution function
of Lv is
P{Lv < l} , ϕ(l) =


0 l ≤ 0
l 0 < l ≤ 1
1 l > 1
. (7)
The probability that node v’s failure is triggered by the
failure and loads sharing from exact m of its neighbors is
P{Lv+m∆ > (1+α)Lv} = P
{
Lv <
m∆
α
}
= ϕ
(
m∆
α
)
.
(8)
Then, the probability that node v is an m-vulnerable
node is
f
(m)
k =
(
k
m
)
(σf+σr)
m (1−(σf+σr))
k−m
ϕ
(
m∆
α
)
. (9)
We substitute Eq. (9) into Eq. (2), and get
sk = fk =
k∑
m=0
(
k
m
)
(σf+σr)
m(1−σf−σr)
k−m
ϕ
(
m∆
α
)
=


k(σf+σr)∆
α
, k ≤
[
α
∆
]
1−
[α/∆]∑
m=0
(
k
m
)
(σf+σr)
m(1−σf−σr)
k−m
(
1−m∆
α
)
, k >
[
α
∆
]
(10)
where [•] is the floor function.
Eq. (10) provides the probability that arbitrary node
in network turns out to be a quasi-failed node. Then, we
will handle the probability of a node comes to be a quasi-
infected node bk. We know the probability that node v
of degree k survives with active state at equilibrium is
(1−sk)(1−bk). These nodes are active nodes, that they are
neither quasi-failed nodes nor quasi-infected nodes. The
state of these active nodes is determined by their neigh-
bors:
1. If their neighbors are quasi-failed or quasi-infected
and finally become failed in cascades, then these ac-
tive nodes may turn out to be failed as the over-
load caused by their neighbors. The probability of
this situation happens is
∑
j
jpj (sj+(1−sj)bj(1−λ))
〈k〉 =
σf + (1− λ)σr .
2. If their neighbors are active nodes, i.e., the neighbors
are neither quasi-failed nor quasi-infected nodes, then
these active nodes will not fail. The probability of this
situation happens is
∑
j
jpj(1−sj)(1−bj)
〈k〉 = 1−(σf+σr).
Thus the probability that a node survives with active
state, hk, can be written follows its neighbors states as
hk =
k∑
m=0
(
k
m
)(
1−ϕ
(
m∆
α
))
(σf+(1−λ)σr)
m(1−σf−σr)
k−m
=


(1−λσr)
k−
k(σf+(1−λ)σr)∆
α
(1−λσr)
k−1, k ≤
[
α
∆
]
[α/∆]∑
m=0
(
k
m
)
(σf+(1−λ)σr)
m(1−σf−σr)
k−m
(
1−m∆
α
)
, k >
[
α
∆
]
(11)
In the first line of Eq. (11),
(
1− ϕ
(
m∆
α
))
indicates the
situation that m of node v’s neighbors are quasi-failed or
quasi-infected nodes but it is still active. Based on the
discussion above, we have hk = (1−sk)(1− bk) = 1−sk−
(1 − sk)bk, where sk is given in Eq. (10). According to
Eq. (10) and Eq. (11), we can get
(1−sk)bk = rk
=


1−
k(σf+σr)∆
α
−(1−λσr)
k+
k(σf+(1−λ)σr)∆
α
(1−λσr)
k−1,
k ≤
[
α
∆
]
[α/∆]∑
m=0
(
k
m
)
((σf+σr)
m−(σf+(1−λ)σr)
m)(1−σf−σr)
k−m
(
1−m∆
α
)
,
k >
[
α
∆
]
(12)
where rk is the probability that a node of degree k be a
removed node in epidemic spreading finally.
Now we complete the derivation by Eq. (4), (5), (10),
(12). These four equations depend on each other. We
can get fk, rk, the fraction of removed nodes Sr, and the
fraction of failed nodes Sf at equilibrium from these four
equations by the following iteration process:
1. Set the initial values. Assign a very small initial value
to rkmin , where kmin represents the minimum degree
of all nodes. Let rk = 0(k > kmin) and fk = 0.
Substitute rk and fk into Eq. (4) and Eq. (5) to get
the initial values of σf and σr.
2. Substitute σf and σr into Eq. (10) and Eq. (12) to
get the values of rk and fk. Substitute the new values
of rk and fk into Eq. (4) and Eq. (5), update σf and
σr. Repeat this step until convergence.
3. Get the fraction of removed and failed nodes at equi-
librium by Sr =
∑
k pkrk and Sf =
∑
k pkfk respec-
tively. With α increases, the Sr will change from zero
to a positive value at αc and this indicates when the
epidemic starts to spread out.
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Simulations. – We mainly focus on the fraction of
active nodes in simulation, and validate the theoretical
results of critical value αc. We carry out the simulations in
BA networks with 5000 nodes and varied average degrees
〈k〉 = 8, 10. The results are averaged over 50 realizations
in each of which the network is independently generated.
The unit of load shared in cascading failure, ∆, is fixed at
0.01.
Before exploring the fraction of active nodes, we firstly
investigate the complementary states consisting of failed
and removed nodes. Fig. 3 presents the fractions of
failed nodes Sf and removed nodes Sr with varied effec-
tive spreading rate λ in BA networks. When α is small ,
the theoretical results are in good agreement with simula-
tion results. While α is large, there is a deviation between
theoretical result and simulation result. The reason for
this deviation is that nodes participates both bond perco-
lation (epidemic spreading) and site percolation processes
(cascading failure) are suppose to be the latter one in the-
oretical prediction. In simulation, a considerable amount
of nodes are infected and become removed when α is large.
We can easily find that each of the curves of simulation
and theoretical results has a turning point at abscissa αc.
In Fig. 3(a), when α is smaller than αc, Sr is very close
to zero, which means the epidemic dies out locally. While
α is larger than αc, Sr is larger than zero, indicating the
epidemic spreads out and infects a portion of the network.
In Fig. 3(b), when α is smaller than αc, Sf decreases with
increasing of α. While α is larger than αc, Sf decreases
more slowly, indicating the cascading failure slows down,
and epidemic spreads out and infects a fraction of the net-
work. This is an interesting phenomenon that even if the
infection probability is very large, the epidemic still dies
out when α is smaller than αc. This is because, when α
is small, very few initial infected nodes can lead to severe
cascading failure, which cuts off the spreading paths of the
epidemic.
Then we explore the fraction of active nodes Sa and the
fraction of the giant component G formed by them when
the two dynamics of epidemic spreading and cascading
failure are terminated, as shown in Fig. 4. Simulation
and theoretical results of Sa are both plotted. Because in
a data communication network, the fraction of the largest
connected sub-network formed by active nodes (the gi-
ant component of active nodes, G) is the important frac-
tion to capture the robustness of the network with respect
to structural damage and maintain the network functions
[27]. Though the sizes of G and Sa are different, their
humps meet the peaks at almost the same α value which
is very close to the critical value αc. This means that our
theoretical method can be used to estimate the critical
value αc as well as the optimal value of α at which most
active nodes are remained. It is worth noting that the frac-
tion of active nodes is remarkably larger than that of stan-
dard SIR model (the size for remaining active nodes is very
close to zero with large λ in standard SIR model), because
in our model, the cascading failure blocks the spreading
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Fig. 3: (Color online) The fractions of removed (a) and failed
(b) nodes after the dynamics are terminated in BA networks
with 〈k〉 = 10 and varied λ values are displayed. The red
dashed lines are simulation results and the black solid lines are
theoretical results. For theoretical results, the turning points
(whose abscissas are αc) with λ = 0.5, 0.6, 0.75, 1 are marked
by solid diamond (), circle (•), square (), and down-pointing
triangle (H) respectively.
of the epidemic, as we have mentioned above.
Conclusion. – In this paper, we explore a model
based on the SIR epidemic spreading model and a local
load sharing cascading failure model. With change of tol-
erance parameter α, there exists a critical value αc that
whether the epidemic with large λ is bocked by cascading
failure. When α < αc, cascading failure cuts off abun-
dant of paths and block the spreading of epidemic locally.
While α > αc, epidemic spreads out and infects a fraction
of the network. We propose a method for estimating αc
which is applicable in uncorrelated networks. In simula-
tion, we validate the effectiveness of this method in BA
networks.
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